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In the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah
ZION'S SERVICE CORPORATION,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
H. A. DANIELSON,

CASE
No. 9232

Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Defendant and Appellant

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The plaintiff in this action (respondent herein)
filed suit against defendant (appellant herein) alleging that defendant owed plaintiff Three Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Six ($3,626.00) Dollars
plus interest on a contract between plaintiff and defendant.
At the time the plaintiff Corporation was organized in December of 1955, the defendant was listed
as one or the original incorporators. The Articles
.of Incorporation of Plaintiffs corporation states that
one of the purposes of the corporation was- to proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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vide quantities estimates for Masonry Contractors
on the jobs they were to bid, that is, to figure out
the quantity of bricks, mortar, etc., which the contractor would have to use on the job so that he
could make his estimate of costs from this quantities
estimate.
The Minute Book of the Board o.f Directors of
Plaintiff Corporation shows that on January 3, 1956,
a motion was made and passed that the contractor
members of the corporation were to pay to the corporation l 'Yo on housing projects from one to ten
houses; 2'Ya on projects of eleven to twenty-five
houses; and 3o/o on projects of more than twenty-five
houses. Further, on projects other than houses, they
were to pay l a;o of jobs up to $10,000.00, 2'Ya on jobs
up to $25,000.00 and 3'Ya on jobs over $25,000.00.
The Book further shows that the defendant was present at this meeting. However, all of the witnesses,
for both the plaintiff and defendant, testified that
at all times when the plaintiff corporation was
formed and later while it was operating, that the
defendant told all of the directors of the corporation
that he would not pay the corporation any money
either for stock or dues for services as long as a Mr.
Duane White was connected with the corporation
and that everyone knew this because the defendant
thought that Mr. White was dishonest (see deposition of Gerald Whitaker, Page 7 and 8). It proved
later that the defendan't estimation of Mr. White was
correct, as he embezzled some $2,000.00 from the
corporation and was forced to leave the corporation
for that reason in March of 1956.
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After Mr. White left the corporation, defendant
did pay for his stock and made certain "dues" payments to the corporation; however, not on the basis
of the rate set up in the January 3, 1956 meeting.
In fact, the plaintiff corporation did not change
those rates to any of its members at that particular
time. (See trial transcript pages
Thereafter, the plaintiff corporation attempted
to bill the defendant on the basis of the January 3,
1956 minute entry, and defendant refused to pay
on the basis but agreed to pay on the same basis of
the other members of the corporation, stating that
the jobs could not stand such a high fee for the
materials estimate.
Issues were framed and the case proceeded to
trial before the court without jury and resulted in a
judgement by the court in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant in the amount of $3,626.00
plus $435.12 interest and costs, on a contract which
called for the payment of 1% of amount received
by defendant for all jobs up to $10,000.00; 2o/o of all
jobs in excess of $10,000.00 and not over $25,000.00;
and 3°/o on all jobs in excess of $25,000.00.
Statement of Points:

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRE,D IN FINDING THAT
ANY CONTRACT WAS EVER MADE BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND OEFENDANT AS THERE IS NOT
EVIDENCE TO SHOW SUCH A CONTRACT.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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·POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A
CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, BECAUSE UNDER ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT BOUND
TO DO ANYTHING, SO THERE WAS A LACK OF
CONSIDERATION.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR
THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE ALL OF THE EVIDENCE
SHOWS CLEARLY THAT IF THERE WAS AN
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, THAT PLA-INTIFF FIRST BREACHED
THE AGREEMENT AND SO SHOULD NOT BE EN~
TITLED TO RECOVER UNDER THE AGREEMENT.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR
THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE IF THERE WAS AN
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, IT VIOLATES SECTION 25-5-4 U.C.A. 1953
AS AMENDED, IN THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS
NOT IN WRITING.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR
THE PLAINTIFF UNDER AN AGREEMENT BECAUSE SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS VOID AND UNENFORCIBLE BECAUSE IT VIOLATES PUBUC
POLICY AND SECTION 50-1-6 U.C.A. 1953, AS AMENDED, IN THAT IT IS A RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THA1
ANY CONTRACT WAS EVER MADE BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT AS THERE IS NOT
EVIDENCE TO SHOW SUCH A CONTRACT.
From the evidence submitted at the trial it be:omes evident that plaintiff is depending upon one
Jf two items submitte·d as evidence to support their
:laim that a contract was made between plaintiff
and defendant. One would be the articles of incorporation in which the so-called or alleged purpose of the organiation were set out. Of course,
these articles of incorporation do not contain any
provisions whatsoever for the defendant to do; they
do indicate the purpose for which the organization
was organized, but in no way do they bind anyone
to deal with the plaintiff; therefore, there is a complete lack of a contract contained in the articles of
incorporation. Plaintiff herein submitted to the
court as evidence the memorandum of the meeting
note in which it was listed that certain sums were to
be paid to the corporation by members. At this time,
there was nothing said whatsoever about what the
plaintiff was to do for these services, only that
certain sums were to be paid to it by certain members o£ the corporation. Further, at this particular
time, all of the evidence from both plaintiff's and
defendant's witnesses stated that the defendant in
this action at the time this motion was made told
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everyone connected with the organization that as
long as Mr. White was connected with the organiation, he would pay no sums of money to the organization. Therefore, at the time this motion was passed, the defendant specifically told everyone that
he would not agree to anything, and therefore no
contract was made.
It might be plaintiff's contention that later when
the afore-said Mr. White was found to be dishonest
after he stole in excess of $2,000.00 from the corporation, that the defendant then paid some sums of
money into the corporation, thereby agreeing to
the terms of the agrement. However, the evidence
is clear that at the time the defendant paid money
into the corporation, the corporation was not itself
following its own rules of the aforesaid meeting
minutes in billing its members. It was merely placing figures, which apparently had no relationship
to the meeting minutes as set out, and as shown
by plaintiff's own witnesses on cross examination
these figures were followed. (See transcript pages
CJ I - '1 ~
). In some instances these figures
were higher than the aforesaid rates as contained
in the minute meetings, and in most other instances
they were many, many times lower than the aforesaid rates. Therefore, if plaintiff acquiesced to anything at all, he would acquiesce to paying only
those rates the other members were paying, and
not those rates as were indicated in the minutes of
the meeting, which were submitted to the court as
evidence in this case. It is defendant's position, however, that he acquiesced in nothing; that he merely
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presented money to the corporation in order to go
along with the rest of the group. The evidence
clearly shows he at no time after specifically denying that he would pay any money to the corporation
agreed later to pay any specific rates to the corporation; and therefore, no contract was ever made between the I='laintiff corporation and the defendant.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A
CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, BECAUSE UNDER ANY AGREEMENT BE-TWEEN THE TWO, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT BOUND
TO DO ANYTHING, SO THERE WAS A LACK OF
CONSIDERATION.
If there was an agreement between the plaintiff
and defendant, all the evidence shows that the
plaintiff corporation was not bound to do anything
whatsoever. Certain purposes for the existence of
the said corporation were listed in the articles of
incorporation, but there was nothing in them to
bind them to do anything. The plaintiff corporation
could have and did fail to supply defendant with
many of the bids. This was admitted by plaintiff's
own witnesses, and there was nothing that plaintif1
could do about it. If that is what.the corporation was
supposed to do, they failed to do it; and there is no
place in any agreement b.etween the plaintiff and
defendant which required the corporation to do this.
Therefore, the corporation cannot claim that there
was an agreement between the plaintiff and the
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defendant because the corporation was not legally
bound and there was _no consideration on the part
of the corporatio.n for plaintiffs promises to do anything.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR
THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE ALL OF THE EVIDENCE
SHOWS CLEARLY THAT IF THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT/ THAT PLAINTIFF FIRST BREACHED THE
AGREEMENT AND SO SHOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER THE AGREEMENT.
If there was an agreement between plaintiff corporation and defendant, that agreement certainly
contained terms other than those stated in the purpose of the existence of the organization. The plaintiff's own witnesses said that certain members of
the organization joined. the organization for the purpose of investing funds and that promises were
made to the members of the organization that the
profits and fees collected from this organization
were to be invested and that this -would be a very
fine invesment opportunity. (See Gerald L. Whitaker Deposition PP 17). Some members of the corporation joined solely for that purpose, and had no
interest whatsoever in the so-called service provided by the corporation and of supplying quantity
estimates to its members. Since that was part of the
consideration for some of the members for joining,
and the evidence is clear on the subject that the
plaintiff corporation at no time while defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was a member of said corporation made any in..
vestments; the plaintiff failed to carry out the terms
of its agreement with its members. Therefore, plaintiff should be denied any relief in this action since
plaintiff first breached the so-called contract. Further, if it was definitely established that an agreement existed, it was a part of the agreement that
plaintiff organization should supply all its members
with all of the estimates on all of the jobs they did.
The evidence is clear from all of the witnesses that
the plaintiff failed to do this and thereby broke the
terms of their agreement, if such agreement existed.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR
THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE IF THERE WAS AN
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, IT VIOLATES SECTION 25-5-4 U.C.A.
1953 AS AMENDED, IN THAT THE AGREEMENT
WAS NOT IN WRITING.
This agreement was to run for an indefinite
period of time, which was in the contemplation of
all parties to be more than one year, and therefore
the said agreement must be in writing in order to
be in force under the aforesaid Utah statute. The
case of Burk vs Superflo Mfg. Co., 78 Atlantic 2d,
698, held where an agreement between two busi
ness concerns whereby plaintiff, a co-partnership,
agreed to solicit orders for plumbing tools and supplies manufactured by defendant, contained no
provisions for termination of the agreement, but left
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time for performance enterely open; the agreement was unenforcible as a contract not to be performed within one year. The alleged agreement in
this case is of the exact same type as the agreement
in the above case. This agrement was of an indefinite period, and all the parties thereto contemplated that it would run for more than one year.
There were no provisions made for termination of
the agrement, which was a big factor in the above
entitled case, and the said agreement has no memorandum or anything at all signed by the defendant
with which the plaintiff can hope to show as a memorandum in writing of this agreement. Therefore,
the agreement should not be enforced.
The case of Pochall vs Anderson, 91 Southwest
2d 1050, 127 Texas 251, is the case where an employer agreed to pay a ranch foreman an annual
bonus. This agreement had no time provision and
did not contain a method of termination and the
court in that case held that it was within the statute
of frauds and therefore unenforcible, since the
agreement was not in writing. The following cases
from the following states also contain the same provision: North Carolina; Choate Rental Company vs
Justice, 193, S.E. 817, 212 NC 523; Kentucky: Utilities Co. vs Hurst 269 S.W. 525; Maine: Long Cope
vs Lucerne 143 Atlantic 64; Mississippi: Garrachi vs
Sherwin Williams Paint Co. 125 South 410; Tennessee: Deapon vs Tennessee Coal Co. 12 Heish 650;
Texas: Harper vs Loftown & Improvement Co. 228
S.W. 188; Washington: Sish Clearing House vs
Melchon Co., 25 Pac. 2d, 381. The Oklahoma courts
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have also followed the above doctrine. Further,
Corbin on contracts, Sec. 446, states that the courts
of these jurisdictions and other follow this view.
There can be no question in this case that there was
no agreement in writing and therefore this contract
is unenforcible as a violation of Utah statute of
frauds.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR
THE PLAINTIFF UNDER AN AGREEMENT BECAUSE SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS VOID AND UNENFORCIBLE BECAUSE IT VIOLATES PUBLIC
POLICY AND SECTION 50-1-6 U.C.A. 1953 AS
AMENDED, IN THAT IT IS A RESTRAINT OF
TRADE.
Section 50-1-1 U.C.A. 1953 as amended, reads:
"Combinations to co-ntrol prices forbidden- Any combination having for its object
or effort the controlling of prices of any professional services, any products of the soiL
any articles of manufacturing or commerce:
or the cost of exxchange or transportation, is
prohibited and declared unlawful."
Section 50-l-6 U.C.A. 1953 as amended, reads:
"Forbidden Contracts void- Any contract
or agreement in violation of any provision of
this chapter shall be absolutely void."
17 C.J.S.· Sec. 238 Page 622, reads as follows:
"5. Agreement in restraint of trade in
general. - A contract which in its terms is an
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unreasonable restraint of trade is invalid as
agaist upblic policy ... "
- 12 Am Jur, Sec. 167 pp 662 has a similar statement, and Williston on Contracts Vol. 5, Sec. 1663,
is in complete agreement with this statement.
And the Restatement of Contracts, Section
517, says:
"A bargain not to bid at an auction, or
any public competition for a sale or contract,
having as its primary object to stifle competition, is illegal."
Illustration 6 under Sec. 517 reads:
A, B, C and D, building Contractors,
agree with one another to form X association
and that in future bids for the award of building contracts the successful bidder shall pay
X association 2<>fo of the gross amount of the
price fixed in the contract awarded. The
agreement between A, B, C and Dis illegal.''
It is clear from the above that the present case
is exactly the same as illustration 6. A group of contractors. formed the plaintiff corporation and agreed
to give it 1, 2 or 3% of the successful bidders' jobs.
It is against public policy because it stifles competition among Masonry Contractors.
The courts throughout the nation have found
.this to be the case and have declared such contracts
void as against public policy.
This case is so near the case of Masterbuilders
Assn .. of Kansas vs Carson 269 Pac 693, that it would
be hard to find two cases with .the fact situation as
.

.

'
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similar. In the Masterbuilders Assn. of Kansas case
there was a contract entered into whereby the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff association 1/2 of
1 per cent of a contract price over $10,000.00. Onehalf of this amount was to go to the association and
the remaining one-half was to be distributed equally to the five lowest unsuccessful bidders in the contract. The association was an association of contractors in Kansas. Unlike the present case, this was
not a corporation, and the corporation could not
keep the profits itself. The defendant in that case
contested the bill owed to the plainti£f on the
grounds that this contract was against public policy. In that case, as in the present case, the plaintiff
organization furnished quantities estimates to its
members, just as the plaintiff corporation in this
case does. The court says that a contract by members of a voluntary contractors' association in assessing a fee upon each member of a percentage
of the contract price of any public contract secured
by him is against public policy and void regardless
of the lawful intent o£ the parties in making it; and
it is a further fact that the public may not have bee:g
injured in a particular instance. The court held this
.. contract to be void as against public policy for three
specific reasons: (1) That the contractor is likely to
add the cost of •this service to his bid and therefore
pass it on to the consumer. (2) That five others who
did not do any services or any work for this, benefited from the contractor's bid, and (3) Free competition is diminished where all contractors use the
same service from the same source.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
This case is so close to the present case, that
it is difficult to find any difference whatsoever.
Under this case, the contractors formed an association, a profit making corporation, and that corporation was to supply quantities estimates to its members and the fees to be paid were a percentage of
the winning contractor's winning bid. In this case,
a much greater percentage than in the Kansas case.
In the Kansas case the percentage was 1/2 of 1 per
cent of the contract price over $10,000.00. In the
present case, the plaintiff is seeking to recover 1
per cent of the contract price on small contracts, 2
per cent on larger contracts and 3 per cent on even
larger contracts.
This case fits on all fours with the Kansas case.
Number l, the contractor is likely to add the costs
of this service to the consumer. This was in accordance with all of the evidence given in this case.
Plaintiff's own witness, Mr. Whitaker, when his deposition was taken, stated in that deposition that
when he figured the amount to be charged to each
contractor, he would first subtract a percentage of
the bid from the total contract price before taking
the percentage, because it was his idea that the
contractor had added that percentage to his bid
before submitting the bid. Therefore, all the parties
involved contemplated that the contractor would
add this cost to the consumer and therefore the
prices would go ·up. Number 2, those who did not
give any service would benefit in the winning cont'ractor's business. In the Kansas case, only the five
other bidders were to benefit; but in the present
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case, all of the other bidders were members of this
organization and would benefit, because this is a
profit making corporation, which was to invest the
profits herefrom in other corporations and distribute the funds to all of its members, and therefore all
of the members were to benefit, without giving
service to the corporation. Number 3, the corporation, of course, contemplated that all of the contractors would use the same service from the same
source and this service would be an exceptionally
high priced source. The evidence given by plaintiff's own witnesses is that the cost to the wining
member of the corporation which might be $900 in
one case for its service, to an outside member
would run between $20 and $50. What a drastic
increase for the so-called service provided by this
corporation to its members; which increase was to
be passed on to the public, and which increase
was to be shared in by all of the unsuccessful bidders, as being members of this corporation. (See
Deposition of Gerald Whitaker, page 19 and 20).
All the cases that can be found are in agreement with the Masterbuilders Assn. of Kansas vs
Carson case; that is to say that where the above
three factors are present, there is not a case on the
books which does not hold that these contracts
are against public policy. Kentucky Assn. vs Williams, 280 Southwest 937, was a case where a fee
of 1/4 of 1 per cent on all work, plus $50 was to be
paid to the association contractors. Plaintiff argued
that this fee was reasonable, and therefore not
against public policy. The court held that the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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termination is the general tendency at the time of
the contract was made and if opposed to the interest of the public, then the contract is invalid even
though no injury to the public would result in the
particular case, and further took judicial notice of the
fact that it is human nature to place the cost of this
membership in this organization on the contract
price and shift it to the public. A case of the Contractor's Association of Western Pennsylvania vs
Seeds et at 15 At 2d 467, was a case where the contractors were engaged. in heavy building and construction work. Members were to pay 1/10 of 1 per
cent of the gross amount -of each contract in the
area covered by the association. The contract was
in the form of a by-law; and this contract was held
void ·as against public policy. It is quoted in the
Restatement of Contracts, Vol. II, P. 5-18 and the Kentucky Assn. case above. It is held that the defendant
would recoup the fee by adding it to the contract
price, and therefore was against public policy; and
that the by-law has a direct tendency to injure the
public and effect competitive building in that these
parties were all using the same service and therefore there would be no competition whatsoever in
this bid and it gave the members who were unsuccessful in the bidding an interest in the contract
and this was against public policy.
The Associated Wisconsin Contractors vs Lathers Day of 1940, 291 N.W. 770, was a case where
the plaintiff was seeking to recover from the members of a highway contractors group, who signed
an agreement of the by-laws of the association,
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wherein each member was to pay 1/4 of l per cent
of the contract price. This court held that this was
against public policy, for the same reason as the
above cases. Case of Bailey et al vs. Association of
Master Plumbers, 52 S.W. 853, is where plaintiff
was a non-profit corporation; each member was
required to report in open meeting his jobs and if
his work was completed. They were to pay $7.50 per
bathtub and $7.50 per water closet installed. The
court held that this was against public policy, as it
was destruction oE free competition among its members; it increased the price to the consumer, and the ..
provision was obviously an unreasonable restraint
upon trade, and being so, it is contrary to the public policy and void under the common law of the
country.
The case of the Electrical Contractors Assn. of
Chicago vs. Shulman Electric 57 N.E. 2d 220, 324
Ill. Appellate 28, is a case where plaintiff had an
action to recover dues resulting from by-laws
wherein the members were to pay .4 of l per cent
of all construction and merchandizing business to
the organization. Here it was contended that this
was against public policy and the court held in
this case that this was not against public policy;
however, this case is in complete agreement with
the principles advanced in the foregoing cases.
The difference in this case was that this corporation
was a non-profit corporation and the losing bidders
would not share in the bids of the successful bidders' contracts. Secondly, this court did not feel
in this particular case that the percentage charged
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would be added to the costs; and for these two reasons this court held this agreement to be not against
public policy. However, the case itself indicates
that had the court found these two factors present
as was present in the other cases, and is present
in the case here, that the contract would have been
against public policy.
Griffits & Sprague Stove Co. vs Waterfront Emp.
Assn. of Pacific Coast (C.A. 9) 162 Fed. 29th 1017,
has been cited as holding opposite to the above
cases. It is appellant's contention that the Griffith's
case has no standing here as it is not at all similar
to the present case. In that case, the plaintiff was a
non-profit corporation, which is very important. The
members are persons or firms engaged in the business of carrying cargo by water on Pacific Coast
ports. The organiation was formed to deal with the
longshoremen and to represent the members in
dealing with longshoremen on working condition
and other factors. In other words, it was an employers' organization organized solely for the purpose
of dealing with the unions. The membership dues
were to be 2 1/2 cents per ton carried by the members. However, there is no showing in that case
whatsoever that the members were directly bidding
against each other to obtain jobs and that the 2 1/2
cents per ton were to .be added to the job costs.
The court in that case did find that the agreement
was not against p_ublic policy and that defendant
would have had to pay someone for these services
had he not paid plaintiff corporation and that the
fee in question was reasonable in light of the servSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ices performed. In that case, many factors were not
present which are present in this case. These factors
are (l) Plaintiff corporation was a non-profit corporation and the other members therefore were not to
share in the dues paid in by members of the corporation. (2) There was no showing of competition
between the members of the corporation, and that
the 2 l/2 cents per ton membership dues would
be added to the cost to the ultimate consumer.
Therefore the Griffith's case is not in point and
should not even be considered; when deciding the
question now before the court.
A further element to this same question has
been added by the testimony in this case. It has
been brought out under the testimony that the members of the organization contended that a bid depository would be operated. (See Transcript pp. 9? .)
Although this was not done, it was a part of the
contemplation of the parties. The bid depository was
to be operated wherein bids would be opened before the public opening was had, and wherein the
bighest and lowest bid was to be thrown out. This,
therefore, would raise the price of masonry work
and increase the costs or masonry work to the
public. This is without a question, against public
policy and therefore should void the contract.
This type contract and organiz~tion is against
public policy as it requires successful masonry contractors to support and maintain unsuccessful ones.
The successful bidders would be paying for the
entire costs of the services while those who never
got any bids whatsoever would still reap a proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fit from the successful bidder and might even be
maintained completely by him from the inefficient
contractor and would be allowing him to stay in
business, which is against the free enterprise system of America; wherein the doctrine of free competition, where the efficient survive and the inefficient must seek other types of work, is here violated
and therefore· this alleged agreement is void as
against public policy.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that there was no evidence from
which the court could determine that the parties
hereto had entered into a contract and that if there
was an agreement that plaintiff was not bound to
do anything thereunder so that the agreement
lacked consideration. Further that plaintiff did not
perform as expected by the members of plaintiff
corporation, so plaintiff first breached any agreement which existed. It is also clear that any agreement of this type is against public policy and is
therefore void and unenforcible.
For these reasons, the judgment should be
reversed, with directions to enter a judgment dismissing plaintiff's cause and awarding defendant
his costs herein.
Respectfully submitted by:
NORMAN WADE,
Attorney for Appellant
and Defendant
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